Pretrial Detention and its Contradiction with the Principles of Justice

Abstract

This study examines pretrial detention as a serious criminal procedural measure that infringes upon the personal liberty of the accused prior to the issuance of a conviction. It analyzes the extent to which pretrial detention conflicts with the principles of criminal justice and the presumption of innocence. The research adopts a critical analytical approach to examine the legal provisions governing pretrial detention in the Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure and to assess their practical impact on the rights of the accused. The study demonstrates that the Libyan legislator has excessively expanded the application of this measure and has failed to maintain its intended exceptional nature. Moreover, the relevant legal texts lack essential safeguards, such as a clear definition of “sufficient evidence,” the requirement to provide reasoned detention orders, the accused’s right to challenge such orders, and the availability of compensation in cases of acquittal. The study concludes by emphasizing the necessity of limiting recourse to pretrial detention and adopting effective legal alternatives—such as provisional release and judicial and electronic supervision in order to strike a balance between the protection of society and the preservation of individual liberty.